Two and a half decades have passed since the September 11 attacks, a period defined by the United States’ extensive war on terror. While Washington successfully dismantled major global terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda and Daesh through prolonged military campaigns in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, the broader strategic outcomes remain highly contentious. By deploying tens of thousands of troops and leveraging superior military power, the US ousted regimes in Kabul and Baghdad, citing their alleged support for groups planning attacks on American soil.
However, this aggressive posture has left a legacy of instability and destruction across the Middle East. The strategy, which shifted from targeted counterterrorism to ambitious state-building and political engineering, has been widely criticized for failing to establish durable regional order. In Afghanistan, the US facilitated the return of the Taliban in 2001, only to see the group regain power two decades later following a chaotic and hasty American withdrawal.
The intervention in Iraq similarly produced volatile results. The removal of Saddam Hussein triggered internal sectarian clashes and armed resistance, ultimately creating a power vacuum that allowed for the rise of Daesh. Today, the United States finds itself embroiled in a new conflict with Iran, a nation Washington frequently labels a terror regime. This ongoing hostility, which has disrupted oil trade through the Hormuz blockades, suggests that the post-9/11 approach remains firmly in place.
Despite hopes for a quick resolution, there is little evidence that the conflict with Iran will end soon. Top American officials have cautioned President Donald Trump that the tensions could persist throughout his term, potentially trapping the US in another iteration of a “forever war.”
Analysts point to a fundamental disorientation within American foreign policy, noting that the strategy has fluctuated as Washington sought to capitalize on shifting regional dynamics. Iftikhar Firdous, a senior Pakistani investigative journalist, notes that while dismantling terror networks initially appeared effective, the mission creep into state-building and regime change proved disastrous. “Once you start trying to engineer societies through military power, you enter a completely different strategic environment,” Firdous explains.
Ali Mammadov, a PhD researcher at George Mason University’s Schar School of Policy and Government, highlights a significant disconnect between American military capabilities and political objectives. He argues that while the US could quickly topple hostile governments, it lacked the capacity to resolve the complex ethnic, tribal, and sectarian divisions inherent in nations like Iraq and Afghanistan. “Military superiority alone could not resolve” these deep-seated local issues, Mammadov observes.
Official US government reviews of the Afghanistan campaign have echoed these concerns, identifying a pattern of incoherent strategy, unrealistic timelines, and a fundamental failure to understand local conditions. These policy shortcomings were compounded by the fact that repeated interventions often generated significant political backlash across the region.
Former US diplomat Matthew Bryza, who served on the National Security Council during the 9/11 attacks, notes that Washington never truly assembled a clear, unified strategy. He describes the resulting wars as “very difficult to control,” with the current confrontation with Iran serving as a direct outgrowth of this flawed post-9/11 doctrine.
The consequences extend beyond the Middle East. Firdous argues that these prolonged conflicts have diverted critical strategic attention and resources, leaving American power vulnerable to rising challenges from China and Russia. A recent analysis by the Wall Street Journal supports this view, suggesting that Beijing and Moscow have benefited from the distraction of US forces in the Middle East.
Dania Koleilat Khatib, an expert on Arab-US relations, offers a stark assessment of the era. She contends that the strategy has unequivocally failed, trapping the US in endless wars that have severely damaged its global image and created immense regional instability. As the conflict in Iran continues, the US faces the reality that its technological and military supremacy is insufficient to reshape the political structures of the Middle East. The report also notes that however, the so-called war on terror strategy adopted following the 9/11 attacks has also left a trail of death and destruction across a vast swathe – crippling nations from Afghanistan to the energy-rich Middle East. The report also notes that helping Tehran increase its influence over Iraq, the US invasion also led to the empowerment of pro-Iran armed groups in a country with a large Shia population. The report also notes that experts see many gaps, disorientation, and implementation problems in America’s post-9/11 strategy, which has fluctuated as Washington has occasionally tried to seize opportunities to pull back from turbulent regions, in the face of mixed outcomes from Afghanistan to Iraq and most lately Iran. The report also notes that “But the problem began when the objective expanded from counterterrorism into state-building, regime change and political engineering,” he tells. The report also notes that that is really the central contradiction of the post-9/11 era,” he adds. The report also notes that the US has come to terms with a grim reality: the tech-powered American military supremacy is unable to bring down the Iranian power structure backed by the powerful IRGC, as the Iran war meanders on.