Bringing together Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan—countries with substantial military, economic, and strategic weight—the recently launched Mecca Agreement has sparked intense debate among geopolitical analysts regarding its potential to reshape the Middle East’s security architecture. By uniting three nations with significant regional influence, the agreement signals a growing consensus on the need for greater self-reliance in security matters, moving away from a total dependence on external powers.
A defining feature of the pact is its deliberate lack of a named adversary. Oral Toga, an expert at the Ankara-based Center for Iranian Studies, emphasizes that this omission is a strategic design choice. “It names no adversary, and Ankara has been deliberate about saying so,” Toga explains. “That omission is the design choice that makes everything else possible, because it lets each signatory keep its existing relationships intact.”
The agreement reflects a broader reassessment of regional security following recent confrontations and the shifting dynamics of the Iran-US relationship. For many Middle Eastern governments, these events have underscored the limits of relying solely on external powers for long-term stability. The regional response has so far reflected the agreement’s flexible design, with Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar welcoming the initiative, while Egypt and the United Arab Emirates have yet to publicly endorse the framework.
Ozgur Korpe, an academic at Türkiye’s National Defence University and a military analyst, argues that the agreement’s flexibility is precisely what makes it attractive to countries that may wish to join later. “In this context, it is perceived that the Mecca Agreement gives the impression of a flexible platform open to actors sharing a common vision of stability, rather than an exclusionary structure,” Korpe tells.
“Broad security complexes like the Middle East contain ‘sub-complexes’ within themselves, such as the Gulf or the Levant,” Korpe adds. “It is anticipated that potential participation will occur in a cautious and gradual manner, in accordance with each state’s own sub-regional threat perceptions and security interdependencies.”
Analysts note that regional powers must carefully balance a range of existing security and diplomatic partnerships. “Joining means accepting a commitment that could be invoked by someone else’s crisis, and states with dense relationships on multiple sides will weigh that carefully,” Toga says, referring to countries such as Egypt and several Gulf states.
Qatar is widely seen as one of the strongest candidates to join the framework, given its close defence, political and economic ties with Türkiye. The Gulf state has maintained working relations with Iran while simultaneously serving as a key US security partner and an important mediator between Washington and Tehran, illustrating the complex balancing act required for potential new members.
The prospect of expansion comes as the three founding members begin establishing the agreement’s institutional structure, while Turkish officials say other countries have already expressed interest in joining. Saira Bano, an assistant professor of politics at Thompson Rivers University in Canada, says the agreement is better understood as “an emerging mechanism of regional strategic coordination” than as a NATO-style military alliance.
“However, Gulf and Middle Eastern states have different threat perceptions and different relationships with Iran, Israel and the United States,” Bano notes, adding that this will make “the creation of a unified regional military bloc difficult” in the short term. Toga shares that assessment, arguing that the agreement’s architects envision “selective growth rather than a wave.”
“President Erdogan’s stated vision is a broader structure rather than a permanent trio,” Toga points out. While the agreement contains a collective security principle similar to NATO’s Article 5, it should not be seen as a Middle Eastern version of the alliance. “The agreement contains an Article 5-like principle according to which aggression against one member is treated as aggression against the others. The perception is clear that this kind of alliance is a message to both Iran and Israel,” he tells.
“Israel has its own concern, which already made it clear that they are worried of any kind of alliance between Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan,” Toga adds. “Although it’s initially a result of recent US war on Iran and Iran’s attack on US-related infrastructures in the region, the ultimate goal of this treaty is not to deter or balance Iran rather it is for the means of internalising the regional security architecture.”
“Much will depend on how the agreement develops in practice,” Korpe tells. While Iran’s constitution prohibits formal military alliances, analysts suggest that even Tehran could eventually be a potential candidate for joining this treaty if the regional landscape shifts further. As the founding trio moves forward, the world watches to see if this flexible platform can truly bridge the deep-seated divisions across the Middle East.
“Restoring deterrence is the most important objective of the pact, after the war started on 28 February.
“Expansion is possible, but I would not expect a rapid enlargement into a large formal alliance.
“Some Middle Eastern states may be interested in closer cooperation, particularly if the arrangement remains flexible and does not require them to choose sides in regional rivalries.”
Instead, she expects countries to deepen cooperation in specific areas rather than seek full membership.
If the agreement is designed to remain flexible, what strategic purpose does it ultimately serve?
But the deal also aims to enhance strategic diversification, combining the different capabilities each of the three have, with the aim of reducing dependence from the US,” Zaccara tells.
But it doesn’t mean states are forced to respond automatically to the aggressor.
That interpretation is shared by Mohammed Eslami, a political scientist at the European University Institute.
He even suggests that, depending on how the agreement evolves, Iran itself could one day become part of the framework.
“The agreement could represent an early step towards a more autonomous security architecture among influential Muslim majority states.
Its importance lies less in whether it becomes another NATO and more in what it tells us about the transformation of the regional order,” Bano tells.
“If additional states eventually participate and the agreement develops permanent institutions, regular military consultations, joint exercises and clearer mutual defence obligations, then comparisons with a collective security alliance would become more appropriate.”